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a b s t r a c t
The general strategy of impossible differential cryptanalysis is to first find impossible
differentials and then exploit them for retrieving subkeymaterial from the outer rounds of
block ciphers. Thus, impossible differentials are one of the crucial factors to see howmuch
the underlying block ciphers are resistant to impossible differential cryptanalysis. In this
article, we introduce a widely applicable matrix method to find impossible differentials of
block cipher structures whose round functions are bijective. Using this method, we find
various impossible differentials of known block cipher structures: Nyberg’s generalized
Feistel network, a generalizedCAST256-like structure, a generalizedMARS-like structure, a
generalizedRC6-like structure,Rijndael structures and generalizedSkipjack-like structures.
We expect that thematrixmethod developed in this articlewill be useful for evaluating the
security of block ciphers against impossible differential cryptanalysis, especially when one
tries to design a block cipher with a secure structure.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Differential cryptanalysis [5] and linear cryptanalysis [11] are known to be very powerful cryptanalytic tools for block
ciphers. Since differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysiswere introduced in 1990 and in 1993, theyhave been applied
to many known ciphers very effectively. So, designers have tried to build block ciphers secure against differential and linear
cryptanalysis. Nyberg and Knudsen first proposed the concept of provable security against differential cryptanalysis and
demonstrated provable security for a Feistel structure in 1992 [15].1 Since then, many block cipher structures with provable
security against differential and linear cryptanalysis have been studied [8,15–17], including the MISTY block cipher [12].
However, provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis is not enough to guarantee the security of block
ciphers, because other forms of cryptanalysis may be successfully applied to those not vulnerable to differential and linear
cryptanalysis. For instance, differential and linear probabilities for a 3-round Feistel structure are upper-bounded by a small
value under the assumption that its round functions are bijective and strong against differential and linear cryptanalysis
[1,15]. However, there exists an impossible differential for a 5-round Feistel structurewith any bijective round functions [9].
Similar observations hold for certain other block cipher structures.
Impossible differential cryptanalysis, which is a variant of differential cryptanalysis, was first introduced in 1998 by
Knudsen to conduct a security evaluation of an AES candidate, DEAL [9], and was later extended in 1999 by Biham et. al.
I A preliminary version of this article was presented at Indocrypt 2003 with the title ‘‘Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis for Block Cipher Structures’’
and appeared in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 2904, pp. 82–96, Springer-Verlag, 2003. This work was supported by the Second Brain Korea 21
Project.∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: jongsungk@kyungnam.ac.kr (J. Kim), hsh@cist.korea.ac.kr (S. Hong), jilim@korea.ac.kr (J. Lim).
1 Independently from the Nyberg-Knudsen method, in 1998, Vaudenay proposed another method for provable security against differential and linear
cryptanalysis based on the decorrelation theory [18,19].
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Table 1
Summary of some of our cryptanalytic results.
Structure #subblocks DCa #Fc Ref.
GFNn 2n r ≥ 3n f ≥ 3n2 [16]
Skipjack-(An) n r ≥ n2 − 1 f ≥ n2 − 1 [17]
Structure #subblocks IDCb #Fc Ref.
GFN2 4 r = 7 f = 14 Section 5.1
GFNn (n ≥ 3) 2n r = 3n+ 2 f = 3n2 + 2n Section 5.1
Generalized CAST256 n r = n2 − 1 f = n2 − 1 [17]
GeneralizedMARS n r = 2n− 1 f = 2n− 1 Section 5.1
Generalized RC6 2n r = 4n+ 1 f = 4n2 + n Section 5.1
Rijndael128 16 r = 3 f = 48 [4]
Rijndael192 24 r = 4 f = 96 Section 5.2
Rijndael256 32 r = 5 f = 160 Section 5.2
Skipjack-(An) n r = n2 − 1 f = n2 − 1 [17]
Skipjack-(An) n r = n2 f = n2 Section 5.3
Skipjack-(nAn, nBn) n r = 5n− 1 f = 5n− 1 Section 5.3
Skipjack-(2nAn, 2nBn) n r = 4n− 3 f = 4n− 3 Section 5.3
Skipjack-(3nAn, 3nBn) n r = 5n− 4 f = 5n− 4 Section 5.3
DC: Differential cryptanalysis, IDC: Impossible DC. See Section 2 for the details of the structures stated in this table.
a The number of rounds (r) for which differential probabilities are upper bounded by a small value, if round functions are bijective and strong against
DC.
b The number of rounds (r) for impossible differentials.
c The number of round functions (f ) contained in r rounds.
to analyze iterative block ciphers such as IDEA and Skipjack [2,3]. Up to now, impossible differential cryptanalysis has
been more effectively applied to many block ciphers like IDEA, Skipjack and AES than differential and linear cryptanalysis
have been [2,3,10]. Security against impossible differential cryptanalysis depends on several factors such as the length of
impossible differentials, specific input/output forms of impossible differentials and the strength of the round function. In
general, the existence of impossible differentials is one of the most important factors affecting security against impossible
differential cryptanalysis. They are usually built under a miss-in-the-middle approach2; an impossible differential is based
on two consecutive probability-one differentials which contradict in the middle. Two such differentials are connected to
form an impossible differential.
In this article, we focus on the impossible differential cryptanalysis for block cipher structures whose round functions are
bijective. We provide a general cryptanalytic tool using matrices, which can find various impossible differentials of block
cipher structures. We also provide an algorithm to compute the maximum length of impossible differentials that can be
found using this matrix method.3 We exploit the matrix method to find various impossible differentials of known block
cipher structures. See Table 1 for a summary of our results: according to our results, the generalized MARS-like structure
has the best resistance to the matrix method among all the analyzed structures stated in Table 1, from the viewpoint of the
number of round functions (f ) contained in r-round impossible differentials.
This article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe generalized Feistel, Rijndael and Skipjack-like structures. In
Section 3, we introduce some basic notions for impossible differential cryptanalysis and the matrix method. In Section 4,
we propose an algorithm to compute the maximum length of impossible differentials generated by the matrix method. In
Section 5, we find various impossible differentials of generalized Feistel, Rijndael and Skipjack-like structures. In Section 6,
we discuss how to apply the matrix method to other attacks, and in Section 7, we draw conclusions.
2. Descriptions of block cipher structures
2.1. Generalized Feistel structures
A generalized Feistel structure was first introduced by Nyberg [16]. Let (X0, X1, . . . , X2n−1) be the input to a round
of the structure. Given n round functions F0, F1, . . . , Fn−1 and n round keys K0, K1, . . . , Kn−1, the output of the round
(Y0, Y1, . . . , Y2n−1) is computed by the following formulas.
Y2j = X2j−2 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1,
Y2j−1 = Fj(X2j ⊕ Kj)⊕ X2j+1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1,
Y0 = F0(X0 ⊕ K0)⊕ X1, Y2n−1 = X2n−2.
We denote this generalized Feistel network with n round functions by GFNn. If Fj is regarded as a keyed-round function F
and n = 4, a round of GFN4 is depicted as in Fig. 1.
2 Not all impossible differentials are necessarily constructed under the miss-in-the-middle approach. Some other techniques include the shrinking
technique [3], or simply using just one long differential that never results in a certain output difference.
3 Note that thematrixmethod is one of the tools to find impossible differentials, which can then be used to carry out impossible differential cryptanalysis.
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Fig. 1. A round of GFN4 .
Fig. 2. A round of the CAST256-like structure (n = 4).
Fig. 3. A round of theMARS-like structure (n = 4).
Fig. 4. A round of the RC6-like structure (n = 2).
We describe here three other existing generalized Feistel structures, named generalized CAST256-like, MARS-like and
RC6-like structures [13].4 Single rounds of these structures are described as follows (refer to Figs. 2–4).
Generalized CAST256-like Structure:
Y0 = F(X0)⊕ X1, Yn−1 = X0,
Yj = Xj+1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 2.
GeneralizedMARS-like Structure:
Yj = F(X0)⊕ Xj+1 for 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 2,
Yn−1 = X0.
Generalized RC6-like Structure:
Y2i−1 = X2i−2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
Y2j = F(X2j−2)⊕ X2j−1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1,
Y0 = F(X2n−2)⊕ X2n−1.
2.2. Rijndael structures
Rijndael [6] is a block cipher with an SPN structure (the SPN structure modifies all the subblocks in a round, while the
Feistel structure modifies only a subset of the subblocks). The length of the data block can be specified to be 128, 192, or
256 bits: we denote these structures with 128, 192 and 256-bit blocks by Rijndael128,5 Rijndael192 and Rijndael256 structures,
4 The block ciphers CAST256, MARS and RC6 were all the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) candidates, and MARS and RC6 were in the five AES
finalists.
5 The block cipher Rijndael128 is the AES, which is the one of the most widely used encryption standards in the world.
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Fig. 5. A round of Rijndaelwith a 128-bit data block.
respectively. They are expressed as arrays of 4× 4 bytes, 4× 6 bytes, and 4× 8 bytes. A round of Rijndael consists of four
transformations: SubByte (SB), ShiftRow (SR), MixColumn (MC) and AddRoundKey (ARK).
• SB is a nonlinear byte-wise substitution that applies the same 8× 8 S-box to every byte.
• SR is a cyclic shift of the ith row by i bytes to the left (for Rijndael256, SR operates cyclic shifts of the 0th, 1st, 2nd and 3rd
rows by 0, 1, 3 and 4 bytes to the left, respectively).
• MC is a matrix multiplication over a finite field applied to each column (its byte branch number is 5).
• ARK is an exclusive-or with the round key.
Refer to [6] for the details of these four transformations. A round of Rijndael128 is depicted in Fig. 5 (note that (f ◦ g)(x)
represents f (g(x))).
In this article, we observe the structures of Rijndaelwhose nonlinear byte-wise substitutions, S-boxes, are considered as
bijective black boxes. The S-boxes can be viewed as round functions F implying that Rijndael128, Rijndael192 and Rijndael256
include 16, 24 and 32 F functions in each round.
2.3. Generalized Skipjack-like structures
Skipjack [14] is a 64-bit symmetric-key block cipher designed by the US National Security Agency (NSA), used in tamper-
resistant Capstone and Clipper chips for US government communication purposes. It is an iterative block cipher using two
types of rounds, called Rule A and Rule B. Within the Skipjack cipher, the data block is divided into four subblocks, and eight
rounds of Rule A and eight rounds of Rule B are applied alternatively until the full 32 rounds are achieved. In this article,
we consider various generalized Skipjack-like structures which use generalizations of Rule A and Rule B; we denote these
generalizations of Rule A and Rule B by Rule An and Rule Bn. They are depicted in Fig. 6 and described as follows.
Rule An
{
Y0 = F(X0)⊕ Xn−1, Y1 = F(X0),
Yj = Xj−1 for 2 ≤ j ≤ n− 1.
Rule Bn
{
Y0 = Xn−1, Y1 = F(X0), Y2 = X0 ⊕ X1,
Yj = Xj−1 for 3 ≤ j ≤ n− 1.
Fig. 6. Single rounds of Skipjack-(An) and Skipjack-(Bn).
Weobserve a generalizedSkipjack-like structurewhich uses RuleAn, iteratively. This structurewas already presented in [17].
We denote this structure by Skipjack-(An). Naturally, we can also think of another generalized Skipjack-like structure, called
Skipjack-(Bn), which uses Rule Bn, iteratively. Furthermore, we take into account some other generalizations of Skipjack
which alternatively use Rule An and Rule Bn; precisely, we observe the structures which apply t rounds of Rule An and t
rounds of Rule Bn, alternatively, until a desired number of rounds is achieved. We denote these structures by Skipjack-
(tAn, tBn). In our notation, the original Skipjack structure is the 32-round Skipjack-(8A4, 8B4).
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3. Matrix method for impossible differential cryptanalysis
In this section, we introduce thematrixmethod for finding impossible differentials of block cipher structures.We assume
that a block cipher structure S has n data subblocks, and thus the input and the output of a round are (X0, X1, . . . , Xn−1)
and (Y0, Y1, . . . , Yn−1), respectively. Throughout the article, we consider S whose round functions F are all bijective, and for
which the operation to connect a subblock with another one is XOR, denoted ⊕. In order to obtain a general cryptanalytic
tool for impossible differential cryptanalysis, we first define matrices which represent a round of a block cipher structure.
Definition 1. For a block cipher structure S, the n × n Encryption Characteristic Matrix E and the n × n Decryption
Characteristic MatrixD are defined as follows.
• Constructing E: If Yj is affected by Xi (affectedmeans Yj = Xi ⊕ b, where b is a certain value), the (i, j) entry of E is set to
1. In particular, if Yj is affected by F(Xi) or F−1(Xi), the (i, j) entry of E is set to 1F instead of 1. If Yj is not affected by Xi,
the (i, j) entry of E is set to 0.
• Constructing D: If Xj is affected by Yi, the (i, j) entry ofD is set to 1. In particular, if Xj is affected by F(Yi) or F−1(Yi), the
(i, j) entry ofD is set to 1F instead of 1. If Xj is not affected by Yi, the (i, j) entry ofD is set to 0.
If the number of 1 entries in each column of thematrix is zero or one, we call it property-onematrix (note that the entry
1 is different from the entry 1F ).
Definition 1 shows that each entry of the encryption/decryption characteristic matrix has one of the three values, 0, 1 or
1F , and the ith entry of column j represents whether or not the ith subblock of input affects the jth subblock of output (for
the encryption direction Xi is the ith subblock of input, while for the decryption direction Yi is the ith subblock of input).












Fig. 7. A round of a Feistel structure.
According to Definition 1, the Feistel structure has property-one matrices E andD . If S has property-one matrices E and
D , we can automatically find various impossible differentials of S by the matrix method. In this section, we assume that S
has property-one matrices E andD .
Next,wedefine difference vectorswhich represent the types of differences over rounds, and then explain how to calculate
difference vectors by using the encryption/decryption characteristic matrix and prior difference vectors. Our focus is not on
specific differences over rounds but on difference vectors which are useful for finding impossible differentials of S.
For a given input difference, the possible output differences of each subblock after one or more rounds can be classified
into five types of differences: (1) zero difference, (2) a nonzero nonfixed difference, (3) a nonzero fixed difference, (4)
exclusive-or of a nonzero fixed difference and a nonzero nonfixed difference, and (5) a nonfixed difference (fixed difference
represents a difference which has not been affected by any round key, i.e., by any F function, and nonfixed difference
represents a difference which has been affected by at least one round key, i.e., by at least one F function). It is easy to
see that any subblock difference belongs to one of these five types.
Definition 2. The five types of differences are defined as the entries of difference vectors in Table 2 (note that entry t in
Table 2 is an integer greater than or equal to 2).
Table 2
Entries of difference vectors and corresponding differences.
Entries of difference vectors Corresponding differences
0 zero diff. (denoted 0)
1 nonzero nonfixed diff. (denoted δ)
1∗ nonzero fixed diff. (denoted γ )
2∗ nonzero fixed diff.⊕ nonzero nonfixed diff. (denoted γ ⊕ δ)
t(≥ 2) nonfixed diff. (denoted ?)
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Note that the symbols 0 and 1 can appear either as entries in the encryption/decryption characteristicmatrix, or as entries
in a difference vector. They have different meanings in these two different contexts.
The classification of the entries in Table 2 allows us to distinguish usable ones for finding impossible differentials (all
the entries except for t(≥ 2) are usable for it, which will be explained below). Throughout this article, we use the notation
0, δ, γ , and ? as the differences stated in Table 2; sometimes δ′ (resp., γ ′) is used as the same kind of a difference δ (resp., γ ).
We will not be able to gain any information from the entry t(≥ 2), as this entry can correspond to any subblock difference,
however, in the cases of the entries 0, 1, 1∗ and 2∗, we can gain some useful information for the construction of impossible
differentials; more precisely, we are able to know the differences that these entries cannot correspond to. For example, if 2∗
corresponds to γ ⊕ δ, then it cannot correspond to γ , since γ ⊕ δ 6= γ (in fact, 2∗ can correspond to any difference which
is different from γ ). This fact is useful for finding impossible differentials of S.
For a given input difference α, we denote the r-round output difference by αr , and denote the ith subblock of α (resp.
αr ) by αi (resp. αri ). Similarly, the difference vector which corresponds to α (resp. α
r ) is denoted by Ea (resp. Ear ), and the ith
entry of Ea (resp. Ear ), which corresponds to αi (resp. αri ), is denoted by ai (resp. ari ). If the same analysis is performed through
the decryption process, we use the notation β , βi, βr , βri , Eb, bi, Ebr , and bri instead of α, αi, αr , αri , Ea, ai, Ear , and ari , respectively
(note that α = α0, Ea = Ea0 and β = β0, Eb = Eb0).
The following definition is a specific case for Definition 2.
Definition 3. Given an input difference α = (α0, α1, . . . , αn−1) (resp. β = (β0, β1, . . . , βn−1)), the difference vector Ea =
(a0, a1, . . . , an−1) (resp. Eb = (b0, b1, . . . , bn−1)) corresponding to α (resp. β) is defined as follows.
ai (resp. bi) ,
{
0 if αi = 0 (resp. βi = 0)
1∗ otherwise.
Note that the reason why ai and bi contain only 0 or 1∗ (fixed difference) is that the initial input differences α and β have
not yet been affected by any round key (in our analysis, the key guessing phase for outer rounds of block ciphers is out of
our focus: it follows that ai and bi cannot be 1, 2∗ or t(≥ 2)).
In order to compute Ea r , we need to define a multiplication between a difference vector and an encryption characteristic
matrix. (We omit the explanation for the decryption process, since it is the same as the encryption process.) A difference
vector Ea r can be successively computed as in Eq. (1).
Ea r = ((((Ea ·
r times︷ ︸︸ ︷
E) · E) · · ·) · E) = ((((Ea1 ·
r−1 times︷ ︸︸ ︷
E) · E) · · ·) · E)
= · · · = Ear−1 · E (1)






1×n, where r ≥ 0.
First, we consider a multiplication between an entry of difference vector ari and an entry of matrix Ei,j. The multiplication
ari · Ei,j represents how the input difference of the ith subblock corresponding to ari affects the output difference of the jth
subblock after a round (this depends on the value of Ei,j).
Definition 4. Table 3 illustrates the definition and the meaning of the multiplication ari · Ei,j (recall that the entry ari
corresponds to the difference αri ).
Table 3
Multiplication between a difference vector entry and a matrix entry (k ∈ {0, 1, 1∗, 2∗, t(≥ 2)}).
ari · Ei,j Meaning
k · 0 = 0 Theoutputdifferenceofthejthsubblockisnotaffectedbytheinputdifferenceαri .
k · 1 = k Theoutputdifferenceofthejthsubblockisaffectedbytheinputdifferenceαri .
k · 1F The output difference of the jth subblock is affected by the difference after F when the input difference of F is αri .
0 · 1F = 0 For zero difference, the output difference after F is also zero.
1∗ · 1F = 1 Foradifferenceγ ,theoutputdifferenceafterF is δ.
1 · 1F = 1 Foradifferenceδ,theoutputdifferenceafterF is δ′ .
2∗ · 1F = 2 For a difference γ ⊕ δ, the output difference after F is ?.
t · 1F = t For a difference ?, the output difference after F is also ?.
Note that according to Table 3, Ei,j = 1 if and only if x∗ · Ei,j = x∗, where x∗ represents the difference vector entry 1∗ or
2∗. We say the matrix entry 1 is ∗-preserving. Other matrix entries are not ∗-preserving: Ei,j = 0 if and only if x∗ · Ei,j = 0,
and Ei,j = 1F if and only if x∗ · Ei,j = x.
Second, we define an addition of ari · Ei,j and ari′ · Ei′,j, where i 6= i′. Since the addition of entries represents XOR of
corresponding differences, it can be naturally defined as follows.
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Definition 5. The addition of two entries which have not ∗ is defined as the usual addition over the integers. If one entry,
denoted e, has not ∗ and the other has ∗, then the addition of these two entries is defined as follows (below, when the two
operands for the+ operator are both integers, the operator represents the usual integer addition).
• If the entry e is 0 or 1, then e+ 1∗ , (e+ 1)∗, otherwise e+ 1∗ , e+ 1.
• If the entry e is 0, e+ 2∗ , (e+ 2)∗, otherwise, e+ 2∗ , e+ 2.
Recall that E is a property-one matrix by our assumption, i.e., the number of 1 entries in each column of E is at most one,
and only the matrix entry 1 is ∗-preserving. It follows that there does not exist the addition of two entries both of which
have ∗ (that is why we have not dealt with this case in Definition 5). Table 4 illustrates the relation between the addition of
entries and exclusive-or of corresponding differences. Definitions 2, 4 and 5 show that the multiplication and addition are
well defined (in the sense of the correspondence between difference vectors and differences over rounds). It is easy to see
that the multiplication and addition are all defined over the integers, if the optional symbols ∗ and F (used in 1∗, 2∗ and 1F )
are ignored in the computations.
Table 4
Relation of addition and exclusive-or.
Addition Exclusive-or
0+ k = k 0⊕∆ = ∆
1+ 1 = 2 δ ⊕ δ′ = ?
1+ 1∗ = 2∗ δ ⊕ γ = δ ⊕ γ
1+ 2∗ = 3 δ ⊕ (δ′ ⊕ γ ) = ?
1+ t = 1+ t δ ⊕ ? = ?
1∗ + t = 1+ t γ ⊕ ? = ?
2∗ + t = 2+ t (γ ⊕ δ)⊕ ? = ?
t + t ′ = t + t ′ ?⊕ ? = ?
(k ∈ {0, 1, 1∗, 2∗, t}, t, t ′ ≥ 2, and∆ is the corresponding difference for k.)
To help understand the new operations, we take the Feistel structure as an example. If the input difference vectors Ea and
Eb are (0, 1∗) and (1∗, 0), then Ea r and Ebr are computed by Eqs. (2) and (3); refer to Fig. 8.
Ea1 = Ea · E = (0 · 1F + 1∗ · 1, 0 · 1+ 1∗ · 0)
= (0+ 1∗, 0+ 0) = (1∗, 0),
Ea2 = Ea1 · E = (1∗ · 1F + 0 · 1, 1∗ · 1+ 0 · 0)
= (1+ 0, 1∗ + 0) = (1, 1∗),
Ea3 = Ea2 · E = (1 · 1F + 1∗ · 1, 1 · 1+ 1∗ · 0)
= (1+ 1∗, 1+ 0) = (2∗, 1), (2)
Ea4 = Ea3 · E = (2∗ · 1F + 1 · 1, 2∗ · 1+ 1 · 0)
= (2+ 1, 2∗ + 0) = (3, 2∗),
Ea5 = Ea4 · E = (3 · 1F + 2∗ · 1, 3 · 1+ 2∗ · 0)
= (3+ 2∗, 3+ 0) = (5, 3).
Eb1 = Eb ·D = (1∗ · 0+ 0 · 1, 1∗ · 1+ 0 · 1F )
= (0+ 0, 1∗ + 0) = (0, 1∗),
Eb2 = Eb1 ·D = (0 · 0+ 1∗ · 1, 0 · 1+ 1∗ · 1F )
= (0+ 1∗, 0+ 1) = (1∗, 1),
Eb3 = Eb2 ·D = (1∗ · 0+ 1 · 1, 1∗ · 1+ 1 · 1F )
= (0+ 1, 1∗ + 1) = (1, 2∗), (3)
Eb4 = Eb3 ·D = (1 · 0+ 2∗ · 1, 1 · 1+ 2∗ · 1F )
= (0+ 2∗, 1+ 2) = (2∗, 3),
Eb5 = Eb4 ·D = (2∗ · 0+ 3 · 1, 2∗ · 1+ 3 · 1F )
= (0+ 3, 2+ 3) = (3, 5).
We are ready to show how to use the entries of difference vectors for finding impossible differentials of S. We denote
an r-round impossible differential with an input difference α = (α0, α1, . . . , αn−1) and an r-round output difference β =
(β0, β1, . . . , βn−1) by α9r β .
Property 1. Using Definition 2 and the encryption process, we can get the following four types of impossible differentials.
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Fig. 8. Differences corresponding to Ea r and Ebr , where Ea = (0, 1∗) and Eb = (1∗, 0) (α1 and β0 are nonzero fixed differences and δi are nonzero nonfixed
differences).
• If ari = 0, then we have α9r β , where βi 6= 0.• If ari = 1, then we have α9r β , where βi = 0.• If ari = 1∗, say γ , then we have α9r β , where βi 6= γ .• If ari = 2∗, say γ ⊕ δ, then we have α9r β , where βi = γ .
We can also get the other four types of impossible differentials by using the decryption process. As mentioned before, if
ari = t(≥ 2), we cannot predict the difference corresponding to ari . It follows that the entry t is useless for finding impossible
differentials, however, the entries 0, 1, 1∗ and 2∗ are useful; we denote the set of these entries byU = {0, 1, 1∗, 2∗}.
If ari ∈ U, as stated in Property 1, there exist r-round impossible differentials. Furthermore, S may have impossible
differentials for more than r rounds, when ari ∈ U. To find these long impossible differentials, we need to define an auxiliary
set m¯with respect to the entrym ∈ U. m¯ is defined with the following two properties: first, m¯ is a subset ofU, and second,
the elements of m¯ correspond to the differences distinct from the specific difference associated with the entrym. Note that
the second property for m¯ does not mean that m should be excluded from m¯. Consider 1¯∗ as an example. Assume that the
entry 1∗ corresponds to a nonzero fixed difference γ . Then, the entry 1∗ cannot match the differences such as zero, γ ′(6= γ )
and γ ⊕ δ. So, we have 1¯∗ = {0, 1∗, 2∗}. Similarly, we have m¯ for other elementsm ∈ U.
Definition 6. For the entriesm ∈ U = {0, 1, 1∗, 2∗}, the entry sets m¯ are defined as in Table 5.
Table 5
Differences corresponding to the entriesm ∈ U and the entry sets m¯.
m Difference m¯ Difference
0 0 0¯ = {1, 1∗} δ or γ
1 δ 1¯ = {0} 0
1∗ γ 1¯∗ = {0, 1∗, 2∗} 0 or γ ′(6= γ ) or γ ⊕ δ
2∗ γ ⊕ δ 2¯∗ = {1∗} γ
How can we find impossible differentials for more than r rounds using m ∈ U and m¯, when ari ∈ U? The solution is
simple: we can obtain such long impossible differentials using both encryption and decryption difference vectors. Assume
that ari = 2∗ and br ′i ∈ 2¯∗. Recall that ari = 2∗ means αri = αj ⊕ δ, where αj 6= 0 for some j, and br ′i ∈ 2¯∗ means βr ′i = βk,
where βk 6= 0 for some k (refer to Fig. 8). Hence, there exists an (r + r ′)-round impossible differential α9r+r ′ β , where
αj = βk. Similarly, this kind of impossible differential can be made by other elements ofU, and thus we have the following
property.
Property 2. For any element m ∈ U,
• If ari = m and br ′i ∈ m¯ for some i, then there exists α9r+r ′ β .
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• If ari ∈ m¯ and br ′i = m for some i, then there exists α9r+r ′ β .
In order to compute the maximum number of rounds for impossible differentials that can be found using the matrix
method,6 we define the following.
Definition 7. Given an input difference vector Ea, an entrym ∈ U and a set m¯ in the encryption process,
ME i(Ea,m) , maxr{r|ari = m},
ME i(Ea, m¯) , maxl∈m¯{ME i(Ea, l)},
ME i(m) , maxEa6=0{ME i(Ea,m)},
ME i(m¯) , maxEa6=0{ME i(Ea, m¯)}.
Given an input difference vector Eb, an entrym ∈ U and a set m¯ in the decryption process,
MD i(Eb,m) , maxr{r|bri = m},
MD i(Eb, m¯) , maxl∈m¯{MD i(Eb, l)},
MD i(m) , maxEb6=0{MD i(Eb,m)},
MD i(m¯) , maxEb6=0{MD i(Eb, m¯)}.
We denote maxi,m{ME i(Ea,m) + MD i(Eb, m¯)} by M(Ea, Eb). Then, clearly it holds that M(Ea, Eb) = maxi,m{ME i(Ea, m¯) +
MD i(Eb,m)}.
LetmaxEa6=0,Eb6=0{M(Ea, Eb)} be denoted byM, thenM can be computed by Eq. (4), which will be used in the next section.
M = maxi,m{ME i(m)+MD i(m¯)}
= maxi,m{ME i(m¯)+MD i(m)}. (4)
Thus, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If a round function of a block cipher structure S is considered as a bijective black box and S has property-onematrices
E andD , then the maximum number of rounds for impossible differentials that can be found using the matrix method isM.
Toy example: If a round function of the Feistel structure is bijective, then the lengthM for the cipher is 5.
Using Eqs. (2) and (3), we haveM((0, 1∗), (1∗, 0)) = 5 induced from a31 = 2∗ and b21 = 1∗ ∈ 2¯∗. Similarly, we can
solve the equations related to other difference vectors, Ea and Eb; using the equations, we can check thatM(Ea, Eb) ≤ 4. So,
we haveM = maxEa6=0,Eb6=0{M(Ea, Eb)} = 5. Hence, the Feistel structure has a 5-round impossible differential whose form is
(0, α1)95(β0, 0), where α1 = β0 6= 0 (refer to Fig. 8). Note that this 5-round impossible differential has been observed
in [9].
Note. The matrix method is also applicable to block cipher structures which use different operations rather than the XOR
operation for the diffusion between different subblocks. For instance, when the+ operation is used, the matrix method can
be applied by adopting subtraction differences instead of XOR differences.
4. Algorithm to compute the lengthM
In this section, we propose an algorithm to compute the lengthM. The algorithm is applied to any block cipher structure
S whose round functions are bijective, and encryption and decryption characteristic matrices E and D are property-one
matrices.7We assume that the round functions of S are all bijective and S has property-one matrices E andD .
The algorithm consists of five steps: (1) the first step is to form the encryption characteristic matrix, (2) the second step
is to compute the values ofME i(m), (3) the third step is to form the decryption characteristic matrix, (4) the fourth step is
to compute the values ofMD i(m¯), and (5) the last step is to output the lengthM by applying theME i(m) andMD i(m¯)
computed in the previous steps to Eq. (4). See Algorithm 1. In step 1, the algorithm uses two variables to represent each
entry of the matrix; a variable ei,j and an auxiliary variable e˜i,j are assigned to represent Ei,j: ei,j = 0 if Ei,j = 0, and ei,j = 1
if Ei,j = 1 or 1F . e˜i,j is determined to be 0 or 1 by whether or not Ei,j leads to the ∗-preserving property: e˜i,j = 0 if Ei,j = 1
(which is ∗-preserving), and e˜i,j = 1 if Ei,j = 0 or 1F (which is not ∗-preserving). See the upper part of Table 6. Similarly,
in step 2, for the ith entry of difference vector Ea r , a variable ar,i is assigned as its integer (after removing the symbol ∗ if it
6 As stated above, one can construct impossible differentials using the encryption and decryption characteristic matrices, and difference vectors
(i.e., using Properties 1 and 2). We call such a method ‘‘the matrix method’’.
7 In fact, wemay compute the number of roundsM bymodifying the algorithm even though E andD are not property-onematrices (refer to Section 5.3.)
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Step 1: Form the matrix E = (Ei,j)n×n .
for i = 0 to n− 1
for j = 0 to n− 1
if Ei,j = 0, then ei,j ← 0 and e˜i,j ← 1
if Ei,j = 1, then ei,j ← 1 and e˜i,j ← 0
if Ei,j = 1F , then ei,j ← 1 and e˜i,j ← 1
Step 2: Compute the values ofME i(m).
ME i(m)← 0, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, 0 ≤ m ≤ 3
/∗ Them′s values 0, 1, 2, and 3 indicate the entries 0, 1, 1∗, and 2∗ inU, respectively. ∗/
For each input difference vector Ea /∗ Ea represents Ea0 . ∗/
for i = 0 to n− 1
if a0i = 0, then a0,i ← 0 and aˆ0,i ← 0
if a0i = 1∗ , then a0,i ← 1 and aˆ0,i ←−1
form = 0 to 3
ME i(Ea,m)← 0
r ← 0
while (there exists some index l such that al,r ≤ 2.)
for j = 0 to n− 1
tj ← 0, tˆj ← 0
/∗ tj and tˆj are the temporary parameters to compute the next difference vector Ear+1 . ∗/
for i = 0 to n− 1
tj ← tj + ar,i · ei,j
si ← aˆr,i + e˜i,j
if (si = 1) si ← 0
tˆj ← tˆj + si
r ← r + 1
ar,i ← ti , aˆr,i ← tˆi , for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
for i = 0 to n− 1
if (ar,i = 0) ME i(Ea, 0)← r
if (ar,i = 1 and aˆr,i = 0) ME i(Ea, 1)← r
if (ar,i = 1 and aˆr,i = −1) ME i(Ea, 2)← r
if (ar,i = 2 and aˆr,i = −1) ME i(Ea, 3)← r
for i = 0 to n− 1
form = 0 to 3
if (ME i(m)≤ME i(Ea,m)) ME i(m)←ME i(Ea,m)
Steps 3 and 4: Form the matrixD = (Di,j)n×n , and compute the values ofMD i(m¯).
Compute the values ofMD i(m) by inserting the matrixD into Steps 1 and 2.
for i = 0 to n− 1
MD i(0¯)← max{MD i(1),MD i(2)}
MD i(1¯)←MD i(0)
MD i(2¯)← max{MD i(0),MD i(2),MD i(3)}
MD i(3¯)←MD i(2)
Step 5: Output the lengthM. (Equation (4))
Outputmax0≤i≤n−1,0≤m≤3(ME i(m)+MD i(m¯))
Algorithm 1 to compute the lengthM
Table 6
Meaning of variables used in Algorithm 1 (x = 1 or 2, y ≥ 0).
Variable Meaning
ei,j = 0 Ei,j = 0
ei,j = 1 Ei,j = 1 or 1F
e˜i,j = 0 Ei,j = 1(x∗ · Ei,j = x∗preserves∗.)
e˜i,j = 1 Ei,j = 0(x∗ · Ei,j = 0)orEi,j = 1F (x∗ · Ei,j = x)
(These equations do not preserve ∗.)
ar,i = y (resp., x) TheithentryofdifferencevectorEa r isy(resp.,x∗).
aˆr,i = 0 TheithentryofdifferencevectorEa rhasnot∗.
aˆr,i = −1 TheithentryofdifferencevectorEa rhas∗.
has),8 and an auxiliary variable aˆr,i is assigned as 0 or −1 by whether or not it has ∗: aˆr,i = 0 if the entry has not ∗, and
aˆr,i = −1 otherwise. See the lower part of Table 6. Note that the two auxiliary variables e˜i,j and aˆr,i are used to distinguish
between entries with ∗ and entries without ∗.
With this setting, the algorithm first computes the variables ar+1,j by the matrix multiplication
∑
i a
r,i · ei,j for each j. As
explained in Section 3, ar+1,j larger than 2 are of no use in the matrix method. If ar+1,j ≤ 2, the remaining thing is to identify
∗ in the corresponding entry of the difference vector. In order to identify ∗ we exploit the forgoing auxiliary variables e˜i,j
8 Note that the notation ari represents an entry of difference vector, while the notation a
r,i represents an integer.
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Table 7
Multiplication between a difference vector entry and a matrix entry in Algorithm 1 (identifying ∗).
Entry c, (aˆr,i) of difference vectors Entry d, (˜ei,j) of E c · d aˆr,i + e˜i,j = si if (si = 1) si ← 0
x∗, (−1) 0, (1) 0 0
x∗, (−1) 1F , (1) x 0
x∗, (−1) 1, (0) x∗ −1
x, (0) 0, (1) 0 0
x, (0) 1F , (1) x 0
x, (0) 1, (0) x 0
and aˆr,i; we consider aˆr,i + e˜i,j in our algorithm. We define si = 0 if aˆr,i + e˜i,j = 1, and si = aˆr,i + e˜i,j otherwise. Then, si
can be−1 or 0. It implies that si = −1 represents ∗-preserving and si = 0 represents non ∗-preserving (see Table 7). Recall
that ∗-preserving can be occurred only if Ei,j = 1 which is laid at most once in each column of property-one matrix. Thus, at
most one of si can be−1 and the rest of si are all 0. It follows that the jth entry of output difference vector for the rth round
has ∗ if and only if s0 + s1 + · · · + sn−1 = −1 and ar+1,j = 1 or 2. Using this logic, we identify ∗ in entries of difference
vectors, and computeME i(m) andMD i(m¯). Once we obtainME i(m) andMD i(m¯), we compute the lengthM in the last
step by using Eq. (4). Note that in Algorithm 1, we can store the input difference vector in the last if statement of step 2 (and
of step 4 as well) to obtain specific forms of input and output differences forM-round impossible differentials.
Complexity of Algorithm 1. The running time of Algorithm 1 is dominated by steps 2 and 4, in which the algorithm iterates
by the values of input difference vectors Ea and Eb. The number of these iterations depends on the number of subblocks of
the input difference vectors; more precisely, Algorithm 1 runs 2n iterations to compute ME i(m) and MD i(m) each, and
thus it is in the O(2n) time bound. We expect that for any block cipher structure it is not difficult to carry out the computer
experiments for n ≤ 32.
5. Results for some block cipher structures
In this section, we present specific forms of impossible differentials for some existing generalized block cipher structures.
Wehave experimentally found impossible differentials on themwithin a small number of subblocks. Based onour simulation
results, extended results are given for any number of subblocks. Our extensions are due to the fact that a generalized block
cipher structure has a regular structural feature.
5.1. Generalized Feistel structures
Nyberg’s GFNn has property-one matrices E andD , and thus we can apply Algorithm 1 to the network. As stated above,
the running time of Algorithm 1 depends on steps 2 and 4. However, using the fact that the encryption process of GFNn is
similar to the decryption process,MD i(m) in step 4 can be easily computed from the values ofME i(m). So, we can reduce
half of the running time. For finding the lengthM for GFN16, we have executed a programwritten in Visual C 6.0 and running
on a set of 10 Windows PCs. From this, we have found the lengthM for GFN16 in about 4 hours. In our simulations, we have
also obtained specific forms of various impossible differentials of GFNn, where 2 ≤ n ≤ 16. The following proposition is a
result based on our simulations.
Proposition 1. (1) If a round function of GFN2 is bijective, then the lengthM for the cipher is 7.(2) If a round function of GFNn
is bijective and n ≥ 3, then the lengthM for the cipher is (3n + 2). The generalized forms of the differentials are described in
Table 8.
Furthermore, we have performed a series of simulations on the generalized CAST256-like, MARS-like and RC6-like
structures. It is easy to check that all these structures have property-one matrices E andD .
Proposition 2 ([17]). If a round function of generalized CAST256-like structure (n ≥ 3) is bijective, then the lengthM for the
cipher is (n2−1), and anM-round impossible differential is of the form (0, . . . , 0, αn−1)9(n2−1)(β0, 0, . . . , 0), where αn−1 6= 0
and β0 6= 0. This differential is caused by (0, . . . , 0, αn−1)→3n−3(c, δ, c, . . . , c) < (c, 0, c, . . . , c)←n2−3n+2(β0, 0, . . . , 0).
Proposition 3. If a round function of generalized MARS-like structure (n ≥ 3) is bijective, then the lengthM for the cipher is
(2n − 1), and anM-round impossible differential is of the form (0, . . . , 0, αn−1)9(2n−1)(β0, 0, . . . , 0), where αn−1 6= 0 and
β0 6= 0. This differential is caused by (0, . . . , 0, αn−1)→n+1(c, . . . , c, δ) < (c, . . . , c, 0)←n−2(β0, 0, . . . , 0).
Proposition 4. If a round function of generalized RC6-like structure is bijective, then the lengthM for the cipher is (4n + 1),
andM-round impossible differentials are of the forms (0, . . . , 0, αi, 0, . . . , 0)9(4n+1)(0, . . . , 0, βi+1, 0, . . . , 0), where αi =
βi+1 6= 0 and i is an odd number. This differential is caused by (0, . . . , 0, αi, 0, . . . , 0)→2n+2(c, . . . , c, αi ⊕ δ, c, . . . , c) <
(c, . . . , c, βi+1, c, . . . , c)←n−2(0, . . . , 0, βi+1, 0, . . . , 0), where the positions of αi⊕δ and βi+1 in the contradicted differences
are the same.
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Table 8
Impossible differentials for GFNn .
GFN2
Im.D. 1 (0, 0, 0, α3)97(β ′0, 0, β
′
2, 0)
Reason (0, 0, 0, α3)→6(c, c, c, δ) < (c, c, c, 0)← 1(β ′0, 0, β ′2, 0)
Im.D. 2 (0, 0, α2, 0)97(β ′0, 0, β
′
2, 0)
Reason (0, 0, α2, 0)→4(c, δ, c, c) < (c, 0, c, c)← 3(β ′0, 0, β ′2, 0)
Im.D. 3 (0, 0, α2, α3)97(β0, 0, 0, 0)
Reason (0, 0, α2, α3)→3(c, 0, c, c) < (c, δ, c, c)← 4(β0, 0, 0, 0)
Im.D. 4 (0, 0, α2, α3)97(0, 0, β2, 0)
Reason (0, 0, α2, α3)→3(c, 0, c, c) < (c, δ, c, c)← 4(0, 0, β2, 0)
Im.D. 5 (0, α1, α2, 0)97(β ′′0 , 0, 0, 0)
Reason (0, α1, α2, 0)→2(c, α2, c, c) < (c, β ′′0 ⊕ δ, c, c)← 5(β ′′0 , 0, 0, 0)
Im.D. 6 (0, α1, α2, α3)97(β ′′0 , 0, 0, 0)
Reason (0, α1, α2, α3)→2(c, α2, c, c) < (c, β ′′0 ⊕ δ, c, c)← 5(β ′′0 , 0, 0, 0)
GFNn (n ≥ 3)
Im.D. 1 (0, 0, 0, . . . , 0, α2n−1)93n+2(β ′0, 0, β
′
2, 0, . . . , 0)
Reason (0, 0, 0, . . . , 0, α2n−1)→2n(c, . . . , c, δ, c, c, c) <
(c, . . . , c, 0, c, c, c)← n+2(β ′0, 0, β ′2, 0, . . . , 0)
Im.D. 2 (0, 0, . . . , 0, α2n−2, 0)93n+2(β0, 0, 0, . . . , 0, 0)
Reason (0, 0, . . . , 0, α2n−2, 0)→2n−1(c, . . . , c, 0, c, c) <
(c, . . . , c, δ, c, c)← n+3(β0, 0, . . . , 0)
Im.D. 3 (0, . . . , 0, α2n−2, α2n−1)93n+2(β0, 0, 0, 0, . . . 0)
Reason (0, . . . , 0, α2n−2, α2n−1)→2n−1(c, . . . , c, 0, c, c) <
(c, . . . , c, δ, c, c)← n+3(β0, 0, . . . , 0)
– Im.D.: Impossible differential, αi 6= 0, βi 6= 0, (β ′0, β ′2) 6= (0, 0), β ′′0 = α2 .
– A→r B: r-round probability-one differential (A→ B) for encryption process.
– B←r A: r-round probability-one differential (A→ B) for decryption process.
– c: unconcerned difference, A < B: contradiction between differences A and B.
5.2. Rijndael structures
For one round of Rijndael, each of output subblocks is affected by four input subblocks due to its linear layer composed
of the SR and MC transformations; more precisely, each output subblock is linearly9 affectedby four subblocks after the SB
transformation. Thus, the Rijndael structures have property-one matrices E andD whose columns have all zeroes but four
1′F s each. It follows that Algorithm 1 can be applied to the Rijndael structures. Following is our simulation result.
Proposition 5. (1) (Rijndael128 structure [4]) Given two plaintexts which are equal at all bytes but one, the ciphertexts
after 3 rounds cannot be equal in any column. This 3-round impossible differential is caused by the fact that given two
plaintexts which are equal at all bytes but one, the number of active bytes10 after 2 rounds (forward direction) is 16, while
given two ciphertexts which are equal in any column, the number of active bytes after 1 round (backward direction) is at
most 12. (2) (Rijndael192 structure) Given two plaintexts which are equal at all bytes but one, the ciphertexts after 4 rounds cannot
be equal in any three columns. This 4-round impossible differential is caused by the fact that given two plaintexts which are equal
at all bytes but one, the number of active bytes after 3 rounds (forward direction) is at least 14, while given two ciphertexts which
are equal in any three columns, the number of active bytes after 1 round (backward direction) is at most 12. (3) (Rijndael256
structure) Given two plaintexts which are equal at all bytes but one, the ciphertexts after 5 rounds cannot be equal in any seven
columns. This 5-round impossible differential is caused by the fact that given two plaintexts which are equal at all bytes but one,
the number of active bytes after 3 rounds (forward direction) is at least 24, while given two ciphertexts which are equal in any
seven columns, the number of active bytes after 2 rounds (backward direction) is at most 16.
Note. The impossible differentials presented in Proposition 5 are not the longest ones for the Rijndael structures. Indeed,
there exist 4-round impossible differentials for Rijndael128 [4], 5-round impossible differentials for Rijndael192 and 6-
round impossible differentials for Rijndael256. They are each formed by one-round extensions at the ends of the impossible
differentials in Proposition 5. One-round extensions are done by giving linear restrictions on the ciphertext differences.
However, these extended forms of impossible differentials are not identified by our general matrix method, as they are
rather from the inherent characteristics for the linear transformations of Rijndael.
9 As mentioned before, even though the connection operation is not⊕, the matrix method can be applied.
10 Active bytes represent bytes with nonzero differences.
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Table 9
Impossible differentials for generalized Skipjack-like structures.
Skipjack-(nAn, nBn)
Im.D. (0, α1, 0, . . . , 0)95n−1(β0, β1, 0, . . . , 0)
Reason (0, α1, 0, . . . , 0)→3n−1(c, . . . , c, δ) <
(c, . . . , c, 0)←2n(β0, β1, 0, . . . , 0)
Skipjack-(nAn, nBn)−j
Im.D. (0, . . . , 0, αj+1, 0, . . . , 0)95n−1−j(β0, β1, 0, . . . , 0)
Reason (0, . . . , 0, αj+1, 0, . . . , 0)→3n−1−j(c, . . . , c, δ) <
(c, . . . , c, 0)←2n(β0, β1, 0, . . . , 0)
Skipjack-(2nAn, 2nBn)
Im.D. (0, α1, 0, . . . , 0)94n−3(β0, 0, . . . , 0)
Reason (0, α1, 0, . . . , 0)→3n−1(c, δ, c, . . . , c) <
(c, 0, c, . . . , c)←n−2(β0, 0, . . . , 0)
Skipjack-(2nAn, 2nBn)−n
Im.D. (0, α1, 0, . . . , 0)96n(β0, 0, . . . , 0)
Reason (0, α1, 0, . . . , 0)→5n−4(c, . . . , c, δ) <
(c, . . . , c, 0)←n+4(β0, 0, . . . , 0)
Skipjack-(3nAn, 3nBn), (n ≥ 4)
Im.D. (0, α1, 0, . . . , 0)95n−4(β0, 0, . . . , 0)
Reason (0, α1, 0, . . . , 0)→3n−3(c, . . . , c, δ) <
(c, . . . , c, 0)←2n−1(β0, 0, . . . , 0)
Skipjack-(3nAn, 3nBn)−j , (n ≥ 4)
Im.D. (0, . . . , 0, αj+1, 0, . . . , 0)95n−4−j(β0, 0, . . . , 0)
Reason (0, . . . , 0, αj+1, 0, . . . , 0)→3n−3−j(c, . . . , c, δ) <
(c, . . . , c, 0)←2n−1(β0, 0, . . . , 0)
(αi 6= 0, βi 6= 0, β0 = β1 , and 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 2.)
5.3. Generalized Skipjack-like structures
Sung et al. [17] conjectured that the maximum length of impossible differentials for Skipjack-(An) is (n2 − 1) rounds.
However, we have experimentally found an n2-round impossible differential. The length of this differential cannot be found
by Algorithm 1, since the number of entry 1 for the last column ofD is two, i.e.,D is not property-one matrix. However, in
each column except for the last column ofD , the number of entry 1 is zero or one. By modifying Algorithm 1 to Algorithm 2
below,11 we can find the length of this impossible differential for Skipjack-(An). Using a structural duality between Rule An
and Rule Bn, we can find an n2-round impossible differential for Skipjack-(Bn). The following proposition is a result based on
our simulations.
Proposition 6. If a round function of Skipjack-(An) (resp., Skipjack-(Bn)) is bijective, then the length M is n2, and an M-
round impossible differential is of the form (0, α1, 0, . . . , 0)9n2(β0, β1, 0, . . . , 0), where α1 6= 0 and β0 = β1 6= 0 (resp.,
(α0, α1, 0, . . . , 0)9n2(0, β1, 0, . . . , 0), where α0 = α1 6= 0 and β1 6= 0); this differential is due to (0, α1, 0, . . . , 0)→3n−3
(c, . . . , c, δ) < (c, . . . , c, 0)←n2−3n+3(β0, β1, 0, . . . , 0) (resp., (α0, α1, 0, . . . , 0)→n2−3n+3(c, . . . , c, 0) < (c, . . . , c, δ)←3n−3(0, β1, 0, . . . , 0)).
We have also experimentally found various impossible differentials for other generalizations of Skipjack, denoted
Skipjack-(nAn, nBn), Skipjack-(2nAn, 2nBn) and Skipjack-(3nAn, 3nBn). Even though these structures do not have property-
one matrices (note that these structures have two matrices for encryption and decryption each — one matrix is for Rule An
and the other matrix is for Rule Bn), we can use the matrix method to find various impossible differentials on them as in the
extension from Algorithm 1 to Algorithm 2. Table 9 shows impossible differentials on Skipjack-(nAn, nBn), (2nAn, 2nBn) and
(3nAn, 3nBn) as well as on their modified structures, which have been found by our simulations. In Table 9, the Skipjack-
(tAn, tBn)−l structures are the same as Skipjack-(tAn, tBn) except that they employ (t − l)An instead of the first tAn.
According to our results, Skipjack-(An) and (Bn) are more vulnerable to impossible differential cryptanalysis than the
structures which employ both of Rule An and Rule Bn. Among the latter three structures using both of Rule An and Rule Bn,
the Skipjack-(2nAn, 2nBn) structure has the best resistance to impossible differential cryptanalysis. Note that the 24-round
impossible differential (0, α1, 0, 0)924(β0, 0, 0, 0) of Skipjack-(8A4, 8B4)−4 was already presented in [3] (the 24-round
impossible differential used in [3] starts from the fifth round).
11 We have added 4 lines more to Algorithm 1: the added lines sort out the problem when the entry 1∗ is XORed with the same entry 1∗; our solution is
1∗ + 1∗ = 0 for obtaining stronger impossible differentials, and this kind of event cannot occur except for the first decryption round.
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Steps 1 and 2 in the algorithm of Section 4: ComputeME i(m).
Steps 3 and 4: Compute the values ofMD i(m¯).
For each input difference vector Eb
if (b0i = 0) bˆ0i ← 0, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
else if (b0i = 1) bˆ0i ←−1, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
MD i(Eb,m)← 0, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, 0 ≤ m ≤ 3
r ← 0
if (b00 = 1 and b01 = 1)
b10 ← 1, bˆ10 ← 0, b1n−1 ← 0, bˆ1n−1 ← 0
b1i ← b1i+1, bˆ1i ← bˆ1i+1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 2
r ← 1
while (): same as in Algorithm 1 of Section 4.
ComputeMD i(m) andMD i(m¯).
Step 5 in the algorithm of Section 4:
Outputmax0≤i≤n−1,0≤m≤3(ME i(m)+MD i(m¯))
Algorithm 2 to compute the lengthM for Skipjack− (An)
6. Discussions
An interesting property of the matrix method is that it can be converted to a tool for the SQUARE attack [7]. Consider a
block cipher structure whose round functions are bijective. If a saturated input subblock is considered as the entry 1∗ and
a constant input subblock is considered as the entry 0, then the output states after r rounds are represented by the entries
defined in Section 3: the entry 0 corresponds to a constant value, and the entries 1 and 1∗ correspond to a saturated set, and
the entries 2 and 2∗ correspond to a balanced set. Based on this fact, we have performed simulations for the block cipher
structures which were dealt with in this article, and found that themaximum length of square distinguishers is shorter than
that of impossible differentials on each cipher (for example, GFNn (n ≥ 3) has a (2n+ 3)-round square distinguisher, while
it has (3n+2)-round impossible differentials).We expect that the possibility of applying thematrixmethod to other attacks
may be of interest.
7. Conclusions
In this article, we have devised a general impossible differential cryptanalysis tool using matrices, which is widely
applicable to find impossible differentials for block cipher structures. Using the matrix method, we have presented various
impossible differentials on some existing block cipher structures such as Nyberg’s generalized Feistel network, generalized
CAST256-like, MARS-like, RC6-like structures, Rijndael structures and generalized Skipjack-like structures: according to
our simulation results, the generalized MARS-like structure has the best resistance to the matrix method, due to its high
diffusion effect.
We believe that the matrix method developed in this article is not only useful for evaluating the security of block ciphers
against impossible differential cryptanalysis, but that it can also play an important role in inventing general tools for other
attacks.
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